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BS EN IEC 61784-3:2021

BS EN IEC 61784-3:2021

$215.11

Industrial communication networks. Profiles – Functional safety fieldbuses. General rules and profile definitions

Published By Publication Date Number of Pages
BSI 2021 108
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IEC 61784-3:2021 explains some common principles that can be used in the transmission of safety-relevant messages among participants within a distributed network which use fieldbus technology in accordance with the requirements of IEC 61508 (all parts) for functional safety. These principles are based on the black channel approach. They can be used in various industrial applications such as process control, manufacturing automation and machinery.

PDF Catalog

PDF Pages PDF Title
2 undefined
6 Annex ZA(normative)Normative references to international publicationswith their corresponding European publications
9 English
CONTENTS
14 FOREWORD
16 0 Introduction
0.1 General
Figures
Figure 1 – Relationships of IEC 61784-3 with other standards (machinery)
17 Figure 2 – Relationships of IEC 61784-3 with other standards (process)
18 0.2 Use of extended assessment methods in Edition 4
0.3 Patent declaration
Figure 3 – Transitions from Ed. 2 to Ed. 4 and future Ed. 5 assessment methods
19 1 Scope
2 Normative references
21 3 Terms, definitions, symbols, abbreviated terms and conventions
3.1 Terms and definitions
28 3.2 Symbols and abbreviated terms
3.2.1 Abbreviated terms
29 3.2.2 Symbols
4 Conformance
30 5 Basics of safety-related fieldbus systems
5.1 Safety function decomposition
5.2 Communication system
5.2.1 General
Figure 4 – Safety communication as a part of a safety function
31 5.2.2 IEC 61158 fieldbuses
5.2.3 Communication channel types
Figure 5 – Example model of a functional safety communication system
32 5.2.4 Safety function response time
5.3 Communication errors
5.3.1 General
5.3.2 Corruption
Figure 6 – Example of safety function response time components
33 5.3.3 Unintended repetition
5.3.4 Incorrect sequence
5.3.5 Loss
5.3.6 Unacceptable delay
5.3.7 Insertion
5.3.8 Masquerade
5.3.9 Addressing
34 5.4 Deterministic remedial measures
5.4.1 General
5.4.2 Sequence number
5.4.3 Time stamp
5.4.4 Time expectation
5.4.5 Connection authentication
5.4.6 Feedback message
5.4.7 Data integrity assurance
35 5.4.8 Redundancy with cross checking
5.4.9 Different data integrity assurance systems
5.5 Typical relationships between errors and safety measures
36 5.6 Communication phases
Tables
Table 1 – Overview of the effectiveness ofthe various measures on the possible errors
37 5.7 FSCP implementation aspects
5.8 Models for estimation of the total residual error rate
5.8.1 Applicability
Figure 7 – Conceptual FSCP protocol model
Figure 8 – FSCP implementation aspects
38 5.8.2 General models for black channel communications
5.8.3 Identification of generic safety properties
Figure 9 – Black channel from an FSCP perspective
39 5.8.4 Assumptions for residual error rate calculations
40 5.8.5 Residual error rates
42 5.8.6 Data integrity
43 5.8.7 Authenticity
Figure 10 – Model for authentication considerations
44 Figure 11 – Fieldbus and internal address errors
45 5.8.8 Timeliness
46 Figure 12 – Example of slowly increasing message latency
47 Figure 13 – Example of an active network element failure
48 5.8.9 Masquerade
5.8.10 Calculation of the total residual error rates
49 Figure 14 – Example application 1 (m = 4)
Figure 15 – Example application 2 (m = 2)
50 5.8.11 Total residual error rate and SIL
5.8.12 Configuration and parameterization for an FSCP
Table 2 – Typical relationship of residual error rate to SIL
Table 3 – Typical relationship of residual error on demand to SIL
51 Figure 16 – Example of configuration and parameterization procedures for FSCP
52 5.9 Relationship between functional safety and security
5.10 Boundary conditions and constraints
5.10.1 Electrical safety
53 5.10.2 Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC)
5.11 Installation guidelines
5.12 Safety manual
5.13 Safety policy
54 6 Communication Profile Family 1 (Foundation™ Fieldbus) – Profiles for functional safety
7 Communication Profile Family 2 (CIP™) and Family 16 (SERCOS®) – Profiles for functional safety
55 8 Communication Profile Family 3 (PROFIBUS™, PROFINET™) – Profiles for functional safety
9 Communication Profile Family 6 (INTERBUS®) – Profiles for functional safety
Table 4 – Overview of profile identifier usable for FSCP 6/7
56 10 Communication Profile Family 8 (CC-Link™) – Profiles for functional safety
10.1 Functional Safety Communication Profile 8/1
10.2 Functional Safety Communication Profile 8/2
11 Communication Profile Family 12 (EtherCAT™) – Profiles for functional safety
57 12 Communication Profile Family 13 (Ethernet POWERLINK™) – Profiles for functional safety
13 Communication Profile Family 14 (EPA®) – Profiles for functional safety
14 Communication Profile Family 17 (RAPIEnet™) – Profiles for functional safety
58 15 Communication Profile Family 18 (SafetyNET p™ Fieldbus) – Profiles for functional safety
59 Annexes
Annex A (informative)Example functional safety communication models
A.1 General
A.2 Model A (single message, channel and FAL, redundant SCLs)
A.3 Model B (full redundancy)
Figure A.1 – Model A
60 A.4 Model C (redundant messages, FALs and SCLs, single channel)
A.5 Model D (redundant messages and SCLs, single channel and FAL)
Figure A.2 – Model B
Figure A.3 – Model C
61 Figure A.4 – Model D
62 Annex B (normative)Safety communication channel modelusing CRC-based error checking
B.1 Overview
B.2 Channel model for calculations
Figure B.1 – Binary symmetric channel (BSC)
63 B.3 Bit error probability Pe
Figure B.2 – Block codes for error detection
Table B.1 – Example dependency dmin and block bit length n
64 B.4 Cyclic redundancy checking
B.4.1 General
B.4.2 Requirements for methods to calculate RCRC
Figure B.3 – Example of a block with a message part and a CRC signature
65 Figure B.4 – Proper and improper CRC polynomials
66 Annex C (informative)Structure of technology-specific parts
Table C.1 – Common subclause structure for technology-specific parts
69 Annex D (informative)Assessment guideline
D.1 Overview
D.2 Channel types
D.2.1 General
D.2.2 Black channel
D.2.3 White channel
70 D.3 Data integrity considerations for white channel approaches
D.3.1 General
D.3.2 Models B and C
71 D.3.3 Models A and D
D.4 Verification of safety measures
D.4.1 General
Figure D.1 – Basic Markov model
72 D.4.2 Implementation
D.4.3 Default safety action
D.4.4 Safe state
D.4.5 Transmission errors
D.4.6 Safety reaction and response times
D.4.7 Combination of measures
73 D.4.8 Absence of interference
D.4.9 Additional fault causes (white channel)
D.4.10 Reference test beds and operational conditions
D.4.11 Conformance tester
74 Annex E (informative)Examples of implicit vs. explicit FSCP safety measures
E.1 General
E.2 Example fieldbus message with safety PDUs
E.3 Model with completely explicit safety measures
Figure E.1 – Example safety PDUs embedded in a fieldbus message
Figure E.2 – Model with completely explicit safety measures
75 E.4 Model with explicit A-code and implicit T-code safety measures
E.5 Model with explicit T-code and implicit A-code safety measures
Figure E.3 – Model with explicit A-code and implicit T-code safety measures
76 E.6 Model with split explicit and implicit safety measures
Figure E.4 – Model with explicit T-code and implicit A-code safety measures
Figure E.5 – Model with split explicit and implicit safety measures
77 E.7 Model with completely implicit safety measures
E.8 Addition to Annex B – impact of implicit codes on properness
Figure E.6 – Model with completely implicit safety measures
78 Annex F (informative)Legacy models for estimation of the total residual error rate
F.1 General
F.2 Calculation of the residual error rate
79 Figure F.1 – Example application 1 (m = 4)
Table F.1 – Definition of items used for calculation of the residual error rates
80 F.3 Total residual error rate and SIL
Figure F.2 – Example application 2 (m = 2)
Table F.2 – Typical relationship of residual error rate to SIL
Table F.3 – Typical relationship of residual error on demand to SIL
81 Annex G (informative)Implicit data safety mechanisms for IEC 61784�3 functionalsafety communication profiles (FSCPs)
G.1 Overview
G.2 Basic principles
82 G.3 Problem statement: constant values for implicit data
Figure G.1 – FSCP with implicit transmission of authenticityand/or timeliness codes
83 Figure G.2 – Example of an incorrect transmission with multiple error causes
84 Figure G.3 – Impact of errors in implicit data on the residual error probability
85 G.4 RP for FSCPs with random, uniformly distributed errimpl
G.4.1 General
86 G.4.2 Uniform distribution within the interval [0;2i-1], i ≥ r
88 G.4.3 Uniform distribution in the interval [1;2r-1], i = r
90 G.5 General case
G.6 Calculation of PID
92 Annex H (informative)Residual error probability for example CRC codes(tables for verification of calculation methods)
H.1 Overview
H.2 Example of a 32-bit CRC
93 Table H.1 – Residual error probabilities (RCRC1) for example CRC32 polynomial
94 Figure H.1 – Residual error probabilities (example of a 32-bit CRC – result 1)
Figure H.2 – Residual error probabilities (example of a 32-bit CRC – result 2)
95 Figure H.3 – Residual error probabilities (example of a 32-bit CRC – result 3)
Figure H.4 – Residual error probabilities (example of a 32-bit CRC – result 4)
96 Figure H.5 – Residual error probabilities (example of a 32-bit CRC – result 5)
Figure H.6 – Residual error probabilities (example of a 32-bit CRC – result 6)
97 H.3 Example of a 16-bit CRC
98 Table H.2 – Residual error probabilities (RCRC2) for example CRC16 polynomial
99 Figure H.7 – Residual error probabilities (example of a 16-bit CRC – result 1)
Figure H.8 – Residual error probabilities (example of a 16-bit CRC – result 2)
100 Figure H.9 – Residual error probabilities (example of a 16-bit CRC – result 3)
Figure H.10 – Residual error probabilities (example of a 16-bit CRC – result 4)
101 H.4 Conclusion
Figure H.11 – Residual error probabilities (example of a 16-bit CRC – result 5)
Figure H.12 – Example 1 of improper polynomial
102 Figure H.13 – Example 2 of improper polynomial
103 Bibliography

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BS EN IEC 61784-3:2021
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