{"id":78794,"date":"2024-10-17T18:25:31","date_gmt":"2024-10-17T18:25:31","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/product\/uncategorized\/asce-9780784408933-2007\/"},"modified":"2024-10-24T19:38:08","modified_gmt":"2024-10-24T19:38:08","slug":"asce-9780784408933-2007","status":"publish","type":"product","link":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/product\/publishers\/asce\/asce-9780784408933-2007\/","title":{"rendered":"ASCE 9780784408933 2007"},"content":{"rendered":"
This report focuses on the direct physical causes and contributing factors to the failures of the hurricane protection system during and after Hurricane Katrina.<\/p>\n
PDF Pages<\/th>\n | PDF Title<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1<\/td>\n | Cover <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
4<\/td>\n | Table of Contents <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
6<\/td>\n | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
10<\/td>\n | CHAPTER 1: Introduction <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
11<\/td>\n | Interagency Performance Evaluation Taskforce ASCE\u2019s Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
12<\/td>\n | Other Teams of Investigators This Report <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
14<\/td>\n | CHAPTER 2: New Orleans <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
15<\/td>\n | A City on the River <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
16<\/td>\n | Development on the Marshes <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
17<\/td>\n | New Orleans is Sinking <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
18<\/td>\n | The People of New Orleans <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
19<\/td>\n | A Cultural Treasure <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
20<\/td>\n | CHAPTER 3: Hurricane Katrina The Storm <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
22<\/td>\n | Wind, Water, and Waves <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
26<\/td>\n | CHAPTER 4: Hurricane Protection System <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
29<\/td>\n | Standard Project Hurricane Levees and Floodwalls <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
31<\/td>\n | Datums and Elevations Interior Drainage and Pump Stations <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
34<\/td>\n | CHAPTER 5: The Levees Fail Storm Surge Damage <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
36<\/td>\n | Cracks in the System <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
37<\/td>\n | Flooding Ensues <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
40<\/td>\n | A City Under Water <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
41<\/td>\n | Pump Stations Shut Down <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
42<\/td>\n | CHAPTER 6: Consequences Tragic Deaths <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
44<\/td>\n | Exposure, Injury, and Disease <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
46<\/td>\n | Catastrophic Financial Losses <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
48<\/td>\n | Had the Hurricane Protection System Not Failed Cascading Financial Impacts <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
50<\/td>\n | Prospects for Economic Growth Long Term Health and Safety <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
52<\/td>\n | Evacuees and Their Receiving Communities <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
54<\/td>\n | Impacts to New Orleans\u2019s Culture <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
55<\/td>\n | The Natural Environment <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
56<\/td>\n | CHAPTER 7: Direct Causes of the Catastrophe 17th Street Canal Breach <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
57<\/td>\n | Soil Strength Over-estimated <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
58<\/td>\n | Factor of Safety <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
59<\/td>\n | The Water-Filled Gap <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
61<\/td>\n | London Avenue Canal South Breach <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
62<\/td>\n | Oversimplified Assumptions <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
63<\/td>\n | The Water-Filled Gap \u2013 Again <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
64<\/td>\n | London Avenue Canal North Breach <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
65<\/td>\n | Industrial Canal East Bank North Breach Industrial Canal East Bank South Breach and Industrial Canal West Bank Breach <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
66<\/td>\n | Industrial Canal West Bank South and All Other Levee Breaches <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
68<\/td>\n | Pumping System: Useless During Hurricane Katrina <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
70<\/td>\n | CHAPTER 8: Contributing Factors Risk to New Orleans Not Fully Appreciated <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
72<\/td>\n | Hurricane Protection System Constructed Piecemeal <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
74<\/td>\n | Hurricane Protection System Under-designed <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
75<\/td>\n | Many Levees Not High Enough <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
77<\/td>\n | No One Entity Is In Charge of Hurricane Protection <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
80<\/td>\n | External Peer Review Lacking <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
81<\/td>\n | Funding Process Flawed <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
82<\/td>\n | CHAPTER 9: What Must We Do Next? Understand Risk and Embrace Safety <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
85<\/td>\n | Re-evaluate and Fix the Hurricane Protection System <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
88<\/td>\n | Revamp the Management of the Hurricane Protection System <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
89<\/td>\n | Demand Engineering Quality <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
92<\/td>\n | Acknowledgements <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
93<\/td>\n | Credits <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The New Orleans Hurricane Protection System<\/b><\/p>\n |